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The Agrarian Question of Financial Landscapes:
The Case of Ambon
Otto Hospes
Every agro-ecological situation implies a specific pattern of production and a particular combination of
savings, borrowing and insurance behavior of producers. Likewise, the strategies and services of agricultural
traders and other financial intermediaries depend very much on the agro-ecological situation. Soil conditions,
cropping patterns, water supply and drought might have a strong impact on the nature and number of financial
services in rural areas of developing countries. Predictability, periodicity and diversity of agricultural produc-
tion directly affect decisions of producers related to savings, borrowing and insurance. 
Platteau and Abraham (1987) argue that credit has evolved as a hunger insurance mechanism in fishing
communities in India as a result of daily fluctuations of fishing incomes: a fisherman with surplus income lends
money to his less fortunate fellow fishermen, who are supposed to help him in return when short of money and
food. Southwold (1990) describes how coconut evolved as the major form of collateral for credit for securing
food in a period of drought, failure of the paddy crop and restricted money circulation in rural Sri Lanka. The
regular and relatively predictable income from coconut proved a solid base for copra traders and shopkeepers
to supply credit in cash or goods to farmers. Borren (1986) reports the existence of different flows and forms
of credit in three ecological zones in the Great Scarcies Area of Sierra Leone, each characterized by a partic-
ular cropping pattern. Van Nieuwkoop (1986) finds that in Malaysia, “Paddy farmers who have an income that
is generated only once or twice a year use more informal credit than rubber farmers who have a much more
regular income” (p.60). 
These observations would lead one to expect that the relationship between particular agro-ecological condi-
tions and savings strategies, credit transactions and redistribution of risk, has been the subject of much research
and policy debate. However, only a few empirical studies have explored this relationship, and it is questionable
whether their findings have influenced policy debate at all. Of course, this question is only one of many issues
which arise in the field of rural finance, that is, the complex of decisions of individuals and groups regarding
insurance, savings and credit; services of financial intermediaries; and existing relations and conditions that
affect these decisions and services (cf. Schmidt and Kropp 1987). 
However, even at a time when the role of agricultural credit as a development tool was widely discussed, this
“agrarian question” was hardly addressed (AID Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit 1973). Yet the consid-
erable difficulties in defining “the small farmer” would have provided ample reason to do so. Rice (1973)
mentions that, “no single satisfactory definition is available to distinguish small farmers from medium and
large farmers in all parts of the world” (p.3). However, this conclusion was not followed by a call for a more
contextual approach of the credit problematic that takes into account location-specific ecological and agro-
economic environments. Instead, Rice reassures us that:
The small farmer syndrome is generally recognized -- families owning or leasing small, often discontinuous
plots and trading in a local village market without access to supplies and services essential to modern technolo-
gies, without expectations of living much above the subsistence level, and without political influence. The
problems are sufficiently similar to justify a common research program and look for transferable lessons (Rice
1973: 3).
Only in a rather casual way he finally adds, “But heterogeneity must be recognized: a 20 acre rainfed maize
farmer on a Brazilian hillside is a different economic animal than a half acre Bengali paddy farmer on the flood
plain of Bangladesh” (Rice 1973: 3). Yet the notion that specific agro-ecological conditions, and agro-
economic changes, explain variation of savings and borrowing patterns among the heterogeneous farm house-
holds, has not been worked out. Neither do more recent policy-oriented studies suggest taking a close look at
agro-ecological conditions and savings and credit behavior. For instance, Quinones’ APRACA paper (1985),
called “An Overview of Agricultural Credit Systems in Selected Asian Countries”, concentrates on agricultural
credit policies and institutional systems for agricultural credit. He does make a very general distinction
between cereal production and other sub-sectors of agriculture in Asia, but even this distinction is not part of
his further analysis of appropriate credit policies. 
This paper addresses the agrarian question of financial landscapes of developing countries from both an
analytical-methodological and descriptive-analytical point of view. My first objective is to explain why this
agrarian question has been dealt with so poorly in policy discussions on agricultural credit and rural financial
markets. This poor handling has a wider background and is one of the consequences of the institutional and
instrumentalist bias of participants of these discussions. My argument is that integrated approaches are needed
that look at the impact of location-specific agro-ecological conditions on savings and borrowing behavior in a
double sense, that is, strictly speaking and in relation to (changing) legal, institutional, social and economic
contexts. The use of the metaphor of “financial landscapes” is meant to stimulate a more environmental
approach to borrowing, saving and lending behavior of institutions and individuals1. 
My second objective is to describe and analyze the impact of agro-ecological conditions of rural Ambon,
Indonesia, on savings strategies and credit transactions. This island is characterized by a particular combina-
tion of food and cash cropping that has strongly affected social life and economic development. Of course, one
cannot assume simple and straightforward cause-effect relations. The agro-ecological environment is just one
of the many contexts of savings and credit transactions, which in turn are just some of the many types of human
interaction. Therefore, my case study of rural Ambon includes descriptive analyses of how political-institu-
tional, economic and socio-legal developments have weakened, reinforced, transformed or differentiated the
impact of agro-ecological conditions on savings and borrowing strategies. 
Out of the Question: Agrarian Contexts of Savings and Credit
In this section I review the policy discussion on small farmer credit and its follow-up on the construction of
sustainable rural financial markets. Both discussions are characterized by more or less similar questions and
perspectives, such as the price of credit and its impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of supplying financial
services to the poor. 
In the early seventies the United States Agency for International Development (AID) collected project infor-
mation on the history of its investments in agricultural credit since the early fifties. These project files provided
the basis for the voluminous Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit (1973). The collection of source material
focussed on three principal themes: “(1) the role of institutional credit in small farmer development, (2) the
major institutional alternatives for delivering small farmer credit, and (3) certain policy issues, such as interest
rates, that appear to be critical to the success of these programs” (Rice 1973: 5). The general idea, with respect
to agricultural development, was that credit is supplied in the first place to be used for the purchase of high-
yielding inputs, so that small farmers can overcome their poverty themselves. As a result of the strong emphasis
on credit as a tool to upgrade the small farmers’ sector in the “general direction of modernization” (Geertz
1962), little attention was paid to the diversity of agro-ecological contexts and its implications for credit
programs. Even worse, the debate on the role of credit was based on a specific type of agro-ecological context.
The most important features of this context are: the small-farmer population is primarily concerned with the
production of food-cum-cash crops (like e.g. rice). The agricultural cycle is characterized by regular, but inad-
equate and insecure food production, with one annual harvest preceded by a difficult period of shortage of
food and/or money. This agro-ecological context has seldom been questioned in the debate on the role of
agricultural credit, and has been wrongly assumed to be a kind of constant. For a number of reasons, the rate
of interest on loans, rather than different and changing agrarian contexts, became the main variable in this
debate. 
The Price of Credit
During the AID Spring Review (1973) the growing concern about the need for and policy of providing loans
at low rates of interest to small farmers was strongly expressed. The Review triggered a long series of publica-
tions that disqualified this cheap credit policy as a “grant theory” that was neither of help to small farmers nor
conducive to building sustainable and efficient financial intermediaries. The case against cheap credit shows a
high internal consistency and is easy to summarize: low rates of interest on loans from specialized farm credit
institutions (SFCIs) create an artificial credit demand among the well-to-do. Bank managers and credit agents
are very much inclined to meet this demand and discriminate against small farmers: they face low incomes
from low rates of interest and ration their loan portfolio because it is much cheaper to provide one large loan
rather than a hundred small ones. The distribution of cheap credit implies great losses to the SFCIs: default is
high because cheap credit is easily mistaken for a grant. The demise and resurrection of SFCIs through new
financial injections is the result. The limited possibilities of mobilizing rural savings, as a result of low rates of
interest on savings, further reinforce financial dependency from above. 
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1. For a broader assessment of the metaphor of financial landscapes: see Bouman and Hospes, chapter 1. 
Although the case against cheap credit has become the basis of a follow-up discussion on the construction
of sustainable rural financial markets, the case itself is quite narrow and needs to be critically reviewed from
both actor- and environmental perspectives: 
First, the case seems to be based on the assumption that rural people behave more or less according to a
universal and uniform (high) price-elasticity of the supply and demand of capital. However, the rate of interest
is only one of the determinants of savings and borrowing behavior: many rural people associate banks
primarily with complex procedures, hard collateral requirements, many photocopies, limited opening hours,
bribery and so on. Therefore, one might better speak or calculate -- if quantifiable at all -- in terms of “service
elasticity” (cf. Huppi and Feder 1989: 49) and expect the significance of such elasticity to be great for rural
poor. Even in economic terms, when we take total borrowing costs into account, it is hard to consider the rate
of interest as the major determinant of savings and borrowing behavior. Also, the inverse expectation under-
lying the case against cheap credit, that rates of interest at market levels would make banks eager to lend to
small farmers, is over-optimistic. It expects banks to do the impossible, as McLeod argues elsewhere in this
volume (p.87): “banks simply are not good at competing for this kind of business.” Even worse, the differen-
tial response to changes in rates of interest and the relative importance of those rates versus other financial
services has been very poorly researched and documented from an actor perspective. 
Second, the case against cheap credit has long directed the attention of policymakers and researchers away
from the different and changing environments of rural financial intermediation (cf. Schmidt and Kropp 1987:
49-55) and how these environments affect people’s decisions on monetary and non-monetary forms of savings,
borrowing and repayment. Fortunately, many rural producers seem to have developed comprehensive views
and practices with respect to official credit programs, agricultural price policies and monetary instability. Two
examples suffice.
The first example concerns agricultural price policies. Although it is recognized that the cheap credit policy
is meant to compensate small farmers for low agricultural prices, this insight (Adams 1986) has long been
ignored by national governments and has hardly been further developed in research on institutional sustain-
ability of rural financial agencies. Gentil (1991), who briefly describes the background of quasi-groups of
borrowers and their default behavior, suggests that peasants have a more comprehensive view in this respect:
“In the eyes of the peasants, it is nothing more than a simple form of recovery from the outside of a part of the
surplus that has been withheld from them through taxes, the price system and other forms of levying” (p.4, my
translation).
The second example is the disregard of one of the main features of many developing economies: high
inflation (cf. World Bank 1989). Inflation makes the almost axiomatic recommendation for savings mobiliza-
tion programs contestable: high inflation implies a sharp reduction of purchasing power of those who save in
cash. When inflation soars, conversion of savings in cash into savings in kind might result. However, the back-
ground and motives for conversion of money into valuables, grain, house construction material or cattle have
been largely ignored, or disqualified as hampering development of the financial infrastructure: 
Even the poorer members of the population, surprising as it may seem, have savings which they hold either as
real assets or in monetary form. Usually, however, their savings are not placed at the disposal of others for
investment purposes and, if the households have no investment opportunities, remain unused, or are even squan-
dered for economically and socially dubious purposes. At the same time, there are individuals with investment
opportunities and a desire to invest who, however, lack the financial means because their own resources are
insufficient. The lack of capital for investment in the presence of unused capital which could be invested is a
sign of an underdeveloped financial infrastructure (Schmidt and Kropp 1987: 7).
For these poorer members of the population, however, savings in kind make sense when facing high
inflation. Besides, savings in kind serve as a protection against family claims or as a bank of last resort in case
of emergencies. It is misleading to emphasize the need of savings mobilization in cash and to blame people
who save in kind for the underdevelopment of a financial infrastructure, when these same people simply adapt
their decisions to insecure economic and demanding social environments. 
My conclusion is that the debate on agricultural credit and rural financial markets has not only distracted
attention away from the significance of agro-ecological conditions, but has also largely failed to assess the
differential impact of (changing) political, economic and socio-legal conditions on borrowing and lending
behavior. Not surprisingly, the discussions on the role of agricultural credit and financial institutions as instru-
ments of development have constantly fostered the need to “look for generalizations” during the last two
decades (cf. Rice 1973; Adams and Fitchett 1992: 355), calling for sound policies or winning formulas of
financial intermediation that should preferably be appropriate under any circumstance. Because of this call for
generalizations, descriptive case studies that include contextual analyses of financial intermediaries (Platteau
and Abraham 1987; Bouman 1989; Southwold 1990) are easily neglected. Maybe even worse -- at least from
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the point of view of policymaking -- is that the search for the winning formula erodes abilities and knowledge
to develop location-specific approaches to location-specific problems. 
The now popular call for “sustainable” or “durable” financial markets among policymakers and policy-
oriented researchers might have similar effects. My impression is that sustainability or durability are usually
treated as an “internal” affair of a financial institution or market. Such an approach is to close one’s eyes to
changing and location-specific conditions of financial intermediaries, at the expense of exploring ways to
increase their diversity, flexibility and adaptability.
From Institutional to Integrated Approaches
To circumvent the inherent shortcomings in the discussion of the price of agricultural credit and the need for
sustainable rural financial markets, the development of more integrated approaches to savings and credit
behavior is needed. An integrated approach does not reduce rural actors to interest-led supernumeraries, but
recognizes different types and combinations of savings, borrowing and lending preferences. It combines actor
and institutional analysis, but leaves open whether and where the demand and supply of different financial
services meet. One of the main reasons to study savings and credit transactions from both actor and institu-
tional perspectives is that “not every financial decision of rural households and enterprises leads directly to a
demand for the services of financial institutions” (Schmidt and Kropp 1987: 25). An integrated approach to
savings, borrowing and lending behavior includes analysis of the background and motives for non-monetary
transactions and the conversion of cash to kind and vice versa. An integrated approach does not analyze
savings, borrowing and lending decisions of actors and institutions in isolation, but in relation to (changing)
legal-institutional, social-economic and agro-ecological environments. 
The Significance of the Agro-Ecological Complex of Rural Ambon
Since the sixteenth century the economy of rural Ambon has been characterized by a specific combination
of subsistence-oriented and (world)market-oriented production. Sago and fish are the most important subsis-
tence crops; cloves are the main cash crops. This combination has strongly affected processes of monetization
and commoditization under different political-economic systems. Somehow, the early exposure of the
Ambonese population to merchants and the proceeds of clove sales did not result in a smooth and quick incor-
poration into capitalist world economies. Although Ambon island has been part of national and international
trade networks for centuries, it was not until recently that for many rural people making money has become
more important than gathering subsistence goods like sago and fish. Knaap (1981a) argues that the traditional
economy, in particular sago and fishing, remained the backbone of economic life in Ambon in spite of the intro-
duction of clove cultivation and linking-up with the world economy in the sixteenth century. One might say that
agro-ecological conditions have retarded and filtered processes of monetization and commoditization of rural
Ambon and many other parts of the Moluccan archipelago.
To get an insight into the “internal” mechanisms that have affected these long-term and uneven processes, I
will describe the main features of the agro-ecological complex of rural Ambon and its general implications for
food security, housing, organization of labor, intensification and marketing of produce. This suggests an outline
of the basic patterns of non-monetized agrarian relations and forms of cooperation that have regulated the
demand and supply of labor for traditional house construction, food collection and harvesting of cloves. One
further step is to explain the absence of credit (in monetary form) as a hunger insurance mechanism, credit as
a labor-tying device and -- until recently -- credit as an output-securing device (cf. Platteau and Abraham
1987). Admittedly, this descriptive analysis from “within” results in a somewhat static and one-sided explana-
tion of retarded “processes” of commoditization and monetization in rural Ambon. However, it might well
complement the more historical description of “external” mechanisms of the same retarded processes in the
next section. Both sections together form an excellent starting point for describing the social dynamics related
to the recent erosion of non-monetized agrarian relations, and the sudden increase of credit needs and the
emergence of savings and credit groups, and production-specific credit transactions as output-securing devices
-- all in monetary form.
Soils and Silviculture
In contrast to Java, the soils of the Ambon islands have limited fertility, which reduces technical options for
agricultural development. According to Knaap (1981b), Ambonese soil is not appropriate for export-oriented
agriculture on a large scale. He concludes that silviculture, that does not affect the soil fertility in a dramatic
way, offers the best opportunities given the environmental constraints. Moreover, the planting of trees enables
soils to recover from the cultivation of tuberous plants that exhaust the soil rapidly. In the ecological system of
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Ambon only clove and nutmeg trees were successfully introduced, primarily because they seemed to fit soil
conditions. 
The most salient feature of the agro-ecological complex of rural Ambon is the forests that cover nearly the
whole area. These forests have a great cultural and economic significance. In fact, rural Ambon might be
conceived as a silviculture including different sets of rights on trees and land as main determinants of social
and economic life (cf. Benda-Beckmann 1990). The production features of the two main crops, cloves and
sago, are a second important element of the agro-ecological complex that has far-reaching socio-cultural and
economic consequences. In this article I concentrate on the specific production features of these main crops,
together with their contrasting roles as cash or subsistence crops.
Cloves are a perennial crop that takes five years to reach maturity. However, this is not the beginning of a
rather constant and predictable pattern of annual or two-monthly yields, such as with coconut production. On
the contrary, the production of cloves is irregular and almost unpredictable. Godoy and Bennett (1990) note
that, “cloves have a production cycle in which bumper harvests occur every three to four years, with insignifi-
cant yields between bumper harvests” (p.63). In addition, large variations in production can occur in a small
area, even within village boundaries. The clove buds ripen between August and December, but again there is
much variation in dates. Picked clove buds, however, properly dried, are not perishable and can be stored for
years without losing much of their aromatic quality. 
The production features of sago trees differ sharply from those of other food crops like rice and maize. Sago
trees have no annually recurrent growth pattern. After 20 to 30 years sago trees have reached maturity. Mature
trees are not harvested annually but simply cut down to collect the pith of the tree. Properly processed sago pith
can be kept for many years. Another important feature of sago is that mature trees can be harvested all through
the year and the collection of sago is, therefore, considered part of the gathering economy (Taale 1988: 5). 
Sago is a subsistence crop involved only in regional barter networks (Taale 1988) and not a commodity --
such as rice or maize -- to be sold at regional or national market places. In contrast to sago, cloves are a pure
cash crop initially exclusively produced for the world market. During the last 40 years cloves have been
produced mainly for the national Indonesian market as an ingredient of the very popular kretek cigarettes. The
contrasting roles of cloves and sago together explain the dualistic or “janus-faced” economy of rural Ambon. 
Food Security and Housing
The basic food products of the Moluccan archipelago, sago and fish, guarantee a minimal subsistence basis
in food and housing. The sago palm in particular is a blessing: its pith is used to make porridge and bread. The
long nerves of the palm and its huge leaves are useful for building walls and a roof that need no repair for at
least five years. The lack of protein and taste of sago flour are compensated for by fish, copra and chillies. The
most important feature of sago production is the absence of a particular harvest season. As a consequence,
there is no hunger period nor a shortage of house construction material. This explains the absence of bridging
loans or types of credit and credit relations used as food security mechanisms in the sago economy of Ambon.
Also, there is no tradition of daily savings among women as there is in rice growing areas in Indonesia where
women used to save a spoonful of rice each day for the difficult period preceding the harvest. 
Organization of Labor
The processing of sago does not demand a large labor input. In one week a group of six persons is able to
collect a three months sago supply. The construction of sago houses also does not require much labor input.
With the help of relatives, neighbors, and friends, a house can be built in one day. Cooperative building of sago
houses (masohi) takes place on demand and lacks a distinct rotation pattern and regular intervals. The paradise-
like availability and durability of sago provides no reason to sustain daily labor groups and to develop highly
institutionalized forms of cooperation. There are virtually no “risks of falling short of the required labor”
(Platteau and Abraham 1987: 473) and, consequently, no need to develop mechanisms to ensure “ready avail-
ability of labor in times of peak operations” (Platteau and Abraham 1987: 473) because peak seasons simply
do not occur. The harvest of sago palms is not seen as a question of organizing people at the right time and the
right place because -- to speak in abstract terms -- scarcity of time and places is hardly felt. Strangely enough,
this also applies to a large extent to traditional low-technology fishing. Although the availability of fish is
insecure and subject to fluctuation, it is still considered large enough over time to meet subsistence require-
ments. Chauvel (1981) speaks of “little efforts that are required to meet daily needs of sago, fish and vegeta-
bles” (p.33, my translation). As a consequence, there is no need for intensification of fishing technology and
labor relations, and credit which serves to tie labor has not been developed as a necessary device to organize
the harvest of sago and fish. 
In contrast to sago, cloves cannot be harvested every day of the year. Just before the clove trees begin to
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blossom, the many bundles of cloves have to be picked one by one to maintain their aromatic value. Intensive
production of cloves suggests the existence of more or less sophisticated mechanisms to commit labor in peak
times and/or highly institutionalized forms of cooperation among owners of clove trees. However, production
of cloves is subject to large and uneven fluctuation. As a result, there is hardly any possibility to organize and
sustain cooperative labor groups, in which participants help each other on a balanced reciprocal basis, to
harvest their cloves. In the harvest season the labor of relatives, neighbors and friends is mobilized. The collec-
tive harvest does not so much reproduce specific labor relations, but rather more encompassing social relations
between these relatives, neighbors and friends. It is exactly this family mode of collection that also character-
izes the harvest of subsistence goods, like sago and fish.
Intensification and Marketing of Natural Produce 
Sago and clove production do not require capital-intensive inputs pre-financed by agricultural traders. The
most important tools for the sago harvest are an axe to cut down the palm and a special hatchet to cut its pith.
The cultivation of cloves requires only choppers to cut brushwood between the trees from time to time. The
most important tools for the harvest are ladders and baskets. Sago needs no fertilizers because of the large
number of sago palms and the absence of seasonal blossoming. 
The relative abundance of sago trees or -- to put it differently -- the absence of a particular harvest season,
do not necessitate the use of credit to secure its marketing. Quite the opposite applies to the harvest of cloves
that should take place at the right moment in the right place. However, the use of credit to secure the output of
clove trees is of recent origin. It was simply not necessary during the long colonial period when rulers used
force, monopoly and “slash-and-burn” policies to control the production of cloves. 
The Uncaptured Paradise Under Different Political-Economic Regimes 
In this section the case of rural Ambon is put in a historical perspective to yield insights into how political-
institutional and economic developments have constrained or enlarged money circulation. This historical
description serves several purposes: it is useful to broadly assess the significance of the agro-ecological
complex under different political-economic rule and economic change. Further, it provides a necessary back-
ground to reconstruct the impact of money circulation on the evolution of forms of savings and credit. This will
enable us to comprehensively deal with the question of the impact of agro-ecological conditions on these forms
in the next section.
The political-economic history of Ambon can be roughly divided into four parts: the period preceding the
hegemony of the Dutch East Indies Company in the Moluccas, the period of Dutch monopolistic policy for
clove cultivation that began in 1656 and remained in effect till 1863, the late colonial period from 1864 till
1950, and independent Indonesian rule.
Small, Short and Insecure 
With regard to the first period, Knaap (1981a) mentions that, 
The Dutch, through the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), aimed to control the whole clove trade and for this
purpose made contracts with local authorities to stipulate that the entire harvest be sold to the VOC against a
price yet to be determined. [...] The price that the VOC wished to pay would turn out to be a constant source of
conflict. The VOC was the first in the spice trade to pay their suppliers in cash. However, these suppliers were
not prepared to pay for the rice and textile sold by the VOC because of its poor quality. The money in the hands
of the Ambonese attracted Javanese and Makassar merchants and their goods to the Ambon Islands (p.27, my
translation).
In spite of the contact of the Moluccan population with traders and their money, the traditional economy was
not transformed into a cash economy. Knaap assumes that the trade with foreign merchants was subject to
sharp fluctuations because of the irregular production of cloves. He therefore believes that the traditional
economy and dependence on sago cultivation in most parts of the Ambon islands was not affected. Knaap also
notes that the supply of rice to the islands was relatively insignificant in the seventeenth century. Therefore, it
is unlikely that the rural population became dependent on imported rice, which might have kick-started mone-
tization, as rice was and is not cultivated on rural Ambon. Finally, the largest share of the money ended up in
the hands of local authorities: “The producer did not enjoy the largest share, because the headmen dominated
the trade” (Knaap 1981a: 27). Probably, monetization did not take place on a large scale among masses of
people but was stifled -- in an abstract sense -- in the exchequer of the local head.
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In 1656 the clove monopoly was established by the Dutch VOC. After many years of struggle, this Company
with strong military powers had definitively broken the resistance of Makassar and Portuguese traders and their
coalitions with local rulers. The VOC forced the population to sell cloves to the Company only. In return, the
Company offered to buy all cloves at a fixed price. During the seventeenth century this price was set at 56
rixdollars per bahar (550 pounds): five for the local rulers, one for transport and 50 for the producer (Knaap
1981b). This meant that the producer should be paid about 45 cents per kg of cloves. The farmgate price
remained about the same during the whole seventeenth and eighteenth century and was, for instance, 48 cents
per kg in 1824 (Knaap 1981b: 18). To get an idea of the exchange value of cloves and rice at that time, the
following figures are illustrative: in 1824 50 clove trees, together yielding 500 kg of cloves, would buy more
than four tons of rice that, in turn, might feed 20 people for one year2. The annual import of rice in Ambon was
not more than five to seven hundred tons, to feed not more than 3,500 people for one year.
In principle, a lot of money could be earned by owners of clove trees from the sale of their produce.
However, it is not clear whether the prescribed price of 50 rixdollars was actually paid to the producers and how
much income was extracted as a result of unfair weighing practices (cf. Knaap 1981b). Also, the clove produc-
tion policy of the VOC was responsible for a fluctuating and uncertain income for producers: the VOC ordered
the planting of clove trees when prices were high and their burning when prices were low. Because of a time
lag of about five years between the planting and maturity, this drastic policy was an inappropriate response to
international price developments. This policy only aggravated the uncertainties of irregular clove production,
reinforced the subsistence orientation of the rural population, and confirmed sago instead of rice as the
standard staple. The circulation of Dutch guilders, cloves and rice was simply too small, too concentrated with
a few people, and too irregular to replace fishing and the collection of sago as the bases of rural life. 
In 1863 the VOC was forced to abolish its clove policy because international market prices had sharply
decreased, as a result of the expansion of clove areas outside Indonesia. One of the consequences was that the
rural population no longer faced the insecurity related to the “slash-and-burn” policy of the VOC but, instead,
new insecurity as a result of the strong fluctuation of prices of spices. Spices could not provide a stable
economic basis. Basic life needs were easily met in Ambon, and spices were sold only to meet “small money
needs” (Chauvel 1981: 35). The basis of the economy remained unchanged. “At the end of the colonial era, no
one had found the key to escaping the pattern of sago, fish and coconut” (Chauvel 1981: 35, my translation).
The change of political leadership as a result of independence did not turn the subsistence economy of
Ambon upside down. Until 1965 Ambon was rather the stage for political turmoil and guerilla war. Ambonese
emigrants, who had enjoyed higher education in the Netherlands, declared the South Moluccan Republic
(RMS) shortly after returning to Ambon, causing military intervention by the national government. According
to Fraassen (1981: 31) the RMS was “an economic disaster”. The political turmoil did not stimulate the
national government to invest in peripheral Ambon, while conflicting views among Ambonese people about a
Moluccan republic were a further impediment for regional economic growth. Again, the significance of sago
and fish as subsistence crops and their profound effects on rural life were not reduced, but rather reinforced. 
The Increase in Money Circulation
During the last 25 years a number of mutually dependent changes occurred that are directly related to the
circulation of money, financial needs and access to financial means. These changes strongly affected the subsis-
tence economy of rural Ambon, which for centuries had remained a basically unchanged and uncaptured
paradise, in spite of early exposure to international commodity markets. In the first place, money now circu-
lates faster and among many more people than 25 years ago. Possibilities to earn money from farm and off-
farm activities have greatly improved, due to both an increase in the area of cash crops and an expansion of
government staff and the number of commercial enterprises. Sharply increased prices of cloves have resulted
in enormous cash flows into village economies. Up to the 1960s (cf. Fraassen 1972) cloves yielded prices equal
to only a few 10-cent pieces per kg. However, in the seventies the price of cloves soared, until 1 kg yielded 30
Dutch guilders in 1976 (Fraassen 1981), or about 100 times the pre-war price. Secondly, the supply of money
to villagers by (semi-)government credit institutions has increased enormously. In the seventies the People’s
Bank of Indonesia (BRI) launched a credit program for the intensification of clove production (KIC), and in the
eighties a program (KUPEDES) of special credit facilities for small entrepreneurs and government employees.
Thirdly, the demand for money has increased, too: for daily consumption, housing, school expenditures and the
pilgrimage to Mecca. The restrictive codes on consumption behavior that, for instance, once allowed only
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2. The table of Taale (1988: 182) with annual prices of rice in the period 1744 to 1863, shows that 100 kg of rice in
Ambon cost 5.77 Dutch guilders in 1824. In 1744 the price was 4.05 guilders, whereas in the first half of the eigh-
teenth century the price varied between 3.19 and 10.61 guilders.
village heads to wear shoes, have faded (Fraassen 1981). Access to schools is no longer a privilege of a tiny
elite. 
One cannot underestimate the significance of changes in the consumption standards of rural Ambon. The use
of sago trees for housing and food, in fact, maintained the agrarian relations and forms of cooperation of a
subsistence economy, and did not involve money transactions. Now that rice and concrete houses have become
the new consumption standards of most Ambonese, the key to escaping the pattern of sago, fish and coconut -
- to speak in Chauvel’s terms -- has been found. It is in the minds of the people themselves who are much more
concerned with earning and spending money than was possible in the colonial era. Rice consumption necessi-
tates small daily cash flows. The construction of a concrete house requires a huge amount of money, equal to
the proceeds of a good clove harvest. 
Large-scale and regular money flows in and through rural communities are part of monetization and
commoditization processes that can hardly be compared with the colonial era, when rural money flows were
relatively small, short and insecure. Because of the central role of sago for traditional food supply and housing,
the change of consumption preferences has had a dramatic impact on rural life. New consumption standards
and related money needs have implied the erosion of traditional Ambonese patterns of cooperative food collec-
tion and house construction. Parallel to this break-down of traditional agrarian relations, new types of rela-
tionships and forms of cooperation between villagers have emerged, that include new and different forms of
savings and credit (cf. Hospes 1992a, 1992b). 
Changing Positions in the Market of Money and Trees
The general processes of monetization and commoditization did not affect all rural Ambonese in the same
way, but went hand in hand with more social-economic differentiation among villages and villagers. The
position of a village in regional trade networks proved an important factor in this respect. At intra-village level,
the different positions of villagers in terms of rights to land and trees explained and reinforced the differenti-
ating impact of the increase of money circulation. 
One of those places in rural Ambon where money circulation has extraordinarily increased and has much
affected intra-village relationships is Tulehu. In this section, I will concentrate on changing social and
economic relations between Butonese migrants and their Ambonese hosts, and their credit relations in partic-
ular. In Tulehu these migrants have become important as traders and credit suppliers in the market of cloves and
nutmeg. My purpose is to analyze how the combination of economic change, different rights on land and trees,
and location-specific cropping patterns have affected Ambonese-Butonese relations, including their credit
arrangements.  
A Place Where Money Grows 
The village of Tulehu is situated on the Northeastern coast of Ambon island. It has evolved in the last 20
years as a regional transport and trade center, linking the city of Ambon and the hinterland of the Central
Moluccas. It attracts many people who want to earn an income or enroll in classes at one of the many schools.
Local officials even say that Tulehu now belongs to the urban society. This would have been an unrealistic
statement 20 years ago when Tulehu did not differ much from other villages. Students describe the local
economy as a cash economy where money has to be paid for school fees, breakfast snacks and transportation.
Farmers have their own way to describe complex processes of commoditization and monetization: “biar daun
kasbi, bawa ke pasar, jadi uang” (even casbee leaves turn into money when you bring them to the market).
Adults complain that young boys now demand payment in cash for plucking their coconut trees. 
Nowadays, even those families who are still primarily involved in sago cultivation and subsistence fishing,
spend at least Rp.3,000 (or US$1.70 in 1989) per day to buy rice, some vegetables, a few cigarettes, pay school
fees and -- if necessary -- buy fish. Fortunately, Tulehu offers many opportunities to earn money: street
vending, bus driving, fish trading, boat driving, vegetable selling, and loading and unloading busses and boats.
The villagers speak of “cari uang”, which literally means searching money, as if the money is already there but
only has to be found, like the many sago and fruit trees that have only to be located and harvested. 
Invisible Hands 
Kennedy (1950: 25) described Tulehu as “the biggest negeri population in Ambon” of about four thousand
people. According to the local government, Tulehu had nearly 12,000 inhabitants in 1990 and is the largest
village of Ambon. Villagers agree that Tulehu has become densely populated. The actual number might even
be a few thousand higher because it is rather doubtful that all Butonese migrants are included in the official
count. 
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Upon their arrival on Ambon, Butonese migrants settled at the fringes of the villages and became subsis-
tence farmers and fishermen like many of their Ambonese hosts. The paradise-like Ambon islands have been a
popular destination of many Butonese, who have migrated from the rocky and barren areas of Southeast
Sulawesi since the end of the last century. Today, they form about one third of the rural population. Many of the
Butonese migrants are now entrepreneurs who dominate non-mechanized and mechanized sago processing, as
well as fishing and the clove trade. 
Migrants, such as the Butonese, have no local-traditional land use rights: they are not allowed to cultivate
perennial crops, like cloves and nutmeg, or to build concrete houses on land owned by Ambonese clans.
According to customary law, such actions would imply more or less irreversible ownership rights on the land.
Therefore, many Butonese typically live in simple wooden houses and cultivate annual crops, like tuberous
plants and vegetables. 
The particular role of Butonese in clove production and trade on rural Ambon is very much dependent on
location-specific relationships with the Ambonese. A major determinant of the nature and change of these rela-
tionships has been the enormous increase in the circulation of money. In Tulehu this increase has led to disin-
tegration of agrarian relations and of cooperation among the Ambonese. Parallel to this development, the
Ambonese and Butonese seem to have become closer in a two-fold sense. First, the economic position of many
Butonese has improved vis-a-vis Ambonese in terms of investment capacities, bargaining power and ownership
rights. The growing importance of Butonese tenants and traders as moneylenders has reduced the “distance”
between the privileged and powerful Ambonese land owners and the landless, submissive Butonese migrants.
Butonese and Ambonese have also become closer in a spatial sense. Whereas the early settlers were allowed to
build small and simple houses only in the hills, current generations of Butonese migrants encroach on the
Ambonese center of the village. Many of them build concrete houses that match Ambonese standards. 
The enormous increase of money circulation and money needs on Ambon has affected the social-economic
life of the Butonese in many ways. First, the typical subsistence production of the Butonese has obtained an
extra dimension. It is no longer a survival strategy only: the Butonese, through frugal living, succeeded in
saving much money. My cashflow research among Butonese and Ambonese indicates that average daily
expenses of Butonese are structurally lower than those of Ambonese.
Further, social-economic differentiation has taken place among the Butonese themselves. Most of the
migrants started on Ambon as subsistence farmers and fishermen; now the Butonese have developed other
agro-economic activities as well. Some, especially those who live close to small rivers and large sago forests,
have recently specialized in mechanized sago processing. Others have built large wooden fishing rafts (bagan)
or have become important clove traders. Although there still is a large class of survival-oriented farmers and
fishermen, it would be wrong to consider the Butonese as a homogeneous class of people in terms of agro-
economic activities. In every kampong the Butonese have exploited the particular opportunities of nearby
natural resources, roads and rivers. 
The role of the Butonese in clove production and marketing has drastically altered. Whereas in earlier times
they only helped to process cloves (bantu petik) in the gardens, they are now the largest category of itinerant
buyers of cloves and credit suppliers of rural Ambon. According to the chairman of the village cooperative of
Tulehu that is officially in charge of the purchase of cloves from the farmers since 1980, the need of Ambonese
to sell the usufructuary rights of their clove trees, arose in the seventies when periods between bumper harvests
increased. The increase of money needs as a result of new housing and food standards only reinforced this
need. The Butonese met this demand and quickly became popular tenants-cum-creditors. Their activities soon
began to yield financial benefits. In 1974 the Butonese migrants bought the first pieces of land to build concrete
houses and so consolidate ownership rights. The Butonese also started at that time to fish with the quite
expensive wooden rafts (bagan). Both the concrete houses and the wooden rafts can be seen as turning points
in the economic position and activities of the Butonese migrants of Tulehu. 
Finance and Risk-Minimizing Strategies of Butonese Clove Traders
Butonese traders employ various strategies to buy cloves from Ambonese owners of clove trees. In the
Indonesian language they are called beli cupa, panjar uang, beli buah and sewa pohon. 
Beli cupa literally means “to buy a tin”, and refers to the purchase of fresh cloves using an old tin of
condensed milk as the standard unit. After the purchase, the Butonese dry the cloves in the sun: 12 to 14 tins
of fresh cloves yield about 6 to 7 tins of dried cloves, or 1 kg. As the drying process only takes one or two days,
the buyers hardly bear the risk of a fall of prices. The profit margins are usually small, but keen entrepreneurs
can make a handsome profit. In general, Butonese women seem to be the primary buyers of cloves. They live
close to the clove gardens and can simply wait for the Ambonese farmers to come down from their gardens to
the village. They also move in small groups to those gardens where a harvest takes place. There are distinct
advantages in selling the freshly picked cloves right away to the Butonese women. After a hard day’s work it is
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very satisfying to cash your cloves immediately and not to worry about the drying. Also, money is easier to
hide from greedy relatives than some buckets of cloves. 
Panjar uang means “to advance money”. According to La Macid, who is reputed to be the largest Butonese
clove trader of Tulehu, panjar uang is similar to cengkeh kilo, which means a kilogram of cloves. It refers to a
relatively low fictive price of cloves, used to calculate the amount of cloves needed to repay the advance at a
future date. In rather isolated villages on the large island of Ceram, small shopkeepers supply advances based
on a similar agreement. However, it is not money that is supplied in advance, but consumer goods. 
Beli buah means “to buy the fruit”. It refers to a pre-harvest arrangement in which the right to harvest a tree
is bought when or after the very first signs of the inflorescence of a clove tree are visible. These signs, very
small and light-green leaves, are visible about seven to eight months before the harvest and show which trees
might produce well. 
Sewa pohon is also a pre-harvest arrangement, and means “to lease a tree” through buying the usufructuary
rights of one or more good seasons. Another main difference with beli buah is that sewa pohon implies the
purchase of one or more good harvest seasons. In fact, the lessee provides a medium- to long-term credit to the
owner of the clove trees. The arrangement implies that the creditor does not have to accept a poor harvest as
repayment of the loan, only a good season counts. In case of not easily definable harvests, the lessee and owner
usually agree to share the yield on an equal basis. Both parties might also agree to define a poor or moderate
harvest as repayment of a “half season”. These rules and decisions are ways to deal with the risks related to the
fluctuating and unpredictable production of cloves.
There are some other interesting differences between sewa pohon and beli buah. They all refer to an inverse
relation between risk and profit-making in the clove trade. According to La Batini, a very knowledgeable and
respected Butonese farmer, the following rule of thumb applies to beli buah. A tree that will probably yield
about 10 kg of cloves should be bought for the price of 8 to 9 kg; in case of sewa pohon one does not pay more
than the price of 3 to 4 kg. Other Butonese farmers suggest that the price of a sewa contract should not exceed
half the expected yield, to cover all the costs (maintenance of the clove garden and hire of harvest laborers) and
make a small profit. One explained that “we have already won” at a price of one million rupiah to lease 50 trees
with an average yield of 7 kg per tree and a current market price of Rp.7,000 per kg. In comparison to beli
buah, sewa pohon represents a much larger price and yield risk, but also the promise of a larger profit. The risks
of sewa pohon, however, are differently assessed by Butonese farmers. La Batini, for instance, describes sewa
pohon as to save in a tree. According to him, one cannot make a loss with sewa contracts. It is very striking that
La Batini calculates in absolute terms and not on a time basis (cf. Shipton 1992).
Butonese traders seem very aware of the uncertainties and risks in clove production. The location-specific
and evolving credit or credit-like arrangements with the Ambonese tree owners, mirror these uncertainties and
risks, making them resort to additional adaptations in strategies. The working area of Butonese clove traders is
not necessarily restricted to their own neighborhood. Just before and during the harvest period they can be
found at places where bumper harvests are expected, and making long term pre-harvest arrangements with
owners living in another village or even sub-district. Some Butonese migrants have become much more
reluctant to make long term pre-harvest agreements after clove prices started to fall dramatically in the second
half of the eighties. Others emphasize that such a development only requires an adjustment of the price in a new
agreement. 
Lessons and a Look for “Localization” 
Agro-ecological conditions and economic change in rural Ambon have not only affected the historical
development of Butonese migrants and their lending strategies in particular, but those of other marketing
agencies and financial intermediaries as well, like village cooperatives and rural banks. In this final section I
will describe quasi-official adjustments and informal practices of bankers and cooperative chairmen, who have
realized that the implementation of the official standard programs is not possible. In my view, disregard of the
specific agro-ecological conditions explains much of their problems. National planners ignore these specific
conditions, and so frustrate the rural bankers and cooperative chairmen, who are supposed to finance the clove
production and buy cloves directly from farmer members. I believe that a closer look at agro-ecological condi-
tions might produce useful insights to make location- or region-specific credit programs and so save a lot of
money.
However, it should be emphasized that this brief analysis is not another attempt to extract a financial tech-
nology that guarantees the success of rural banks or cooperatives as official suppliers of financial services.
Their success, defined in terms of either internal sustainability or delivery of financial services to rural poor,
depends not only on agro-ecological conditions, but also, for instance, on political-administrative and
economic environments. I also do not want to suggest that official suppliers of financial services are the sole
agents of change of financial landscapes, and would only need the proper technology to bring prosperity to the
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poor. One should have few expectations of the effect and use of “appropriate” financial technologies in official
policies and programs. Adams’s 20 years of experience with problems in rural financial markets taught him that
the attempts to establish sustainable agricultural credit programs in the past two decades have largely failed
“despite the tens of billions of dollars committed to hundreds of these efforts” (Adams 1992: 5). He also found
that these generous financial commitments sharply contrast with the piecemeal use of new insights in rural
financial markets.
Lessons 
Since 1980, village cooperatives (KUDs) have the official mandate to buy cloves directly from the farmers
for a fixed price. The province of Ambon belongs to the six provinces officially classified as clove producing
areas in 1980. During the last decade this number has grown to 14. Several agencies are supposed to provide
supportive services to the KUDs, such as control of the quality and the marketing of cloves at district level,
horticultural extension and the supply of working capital. The Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is responsible for
supplying financial services. Just before the harvest season, the BRI lends the so-called Kredit Tata Niaga
Cengkeh (TNC) to individual cooperatives, to be repaid at the latest three months after the harvest season that
ends in January.
In the first half of the eighties, cooperatives borrowed enormous amounts of money, that is, 90 to 120 million
rupiah or US$50,000 to 70,000 per cooperative. However, many cooperatives were unable to buy the equiva-
lent in cloves and to wield their monopoly powers in the clove market. The first cooperative managers, who
were only familiar with village shopkeeping -- if at all -- lacked the management capacities to run a million
enterprise. Private traders were much better equipped and/or better informed. In addition, many traders offered
credit as part of a pre-harvest arrangement. As a result, cooperatives were unable to increase their market share
to more than a few percent (cf. Godoy and Bennett 1990). Last but not least, there were simply not enough
cloves to buy in the own village area of the cooperative during the slack seasons between bumper harvests. To
sum up, the BRI had overestimated the entrepreneurial capacities of cooperative officials and had been unaware
of, or at least had underestimated, risks related to marketing of cloves as a result of its irregular production. In
addition, embezzlement of excessive credit took place on a large scale. The result was that many cooperatives
got heavily indebted. 
The directors of the BRI of Ambon have lost faith in the cooperatives, and have adjusted their lending strate-
gies accordingly. New credit applications from heavily indebted cooperatives are now simply refused.
According to cooperative officials, more than one third of the 72 registered cooperatives of the Central
Moluccas belonged to this category in 1990. Next, the volume of the Kredit TNC has been reduced to 8 to 12
million rupiah per cooperative. More importantly, the BRI has put more faith and finance in urban shopkeepers
and wholesalers involved in clove marketing. 
The failure of the direct financing of clove farmers by the BRI has led to a similar response. The program
Kredit Intensifikasi Cengkeh (KIC), meant to increase clove production in Indonesia, started in Ambon in
1975. The BRI supplied credit to smallholders3 in cash and kind with the help of the horticultural department.
A farmer borrowed a standard amount of money and fertilizer per tree to be repaid after the harvest. However,
the use of fertilizer did not lead to an increase in production and, more importantly, did not end the irregular
production. As a result, repayment records were embarrassingly poor. The decision in 1980 to make KUDs
responsible for the collection of cloves and the repayment of loans also did not work out very well and, in the
end, the program was stopped in 1983. The “target group” that has proved most attractive to the BRI are private
traders, that is, professional traders and shopkeepers who are typically part of family businesses, or family-like
trade networks that combine urban and rural areas. 
The village cooperatives, that is, the chairmen and their assistants, have also been much more inclined to
develop sound working relations with private traders than with farmer members living in their own village. The
opportunities for cooperative officials to develop stable working relations with farmers are very much
restricted, due to the irregular production of cloves and its very labor-extensive cultivation outside the harvest
season. The working area of private traders is not restricted or bound to a village area. As a result, traders are
much more able to secure the supply of cloves than are cooperatives. Wholesalers sell their cloves at the central
cooperative (PUSKUD) via the KUDs, at times when market prices are much lower than the standard price
offered by the PUSKUD. Some cooperatives even place their Kredit TNC at the disposal of these wholesalers.
Other cooperatives imitate the strategies of private traders and have started to operate in a larger area,
contacting farmers of other villages and buying their cloves well in advance. 
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3. According to Godoy and Bennett (1990) in 1983, “The area under cloves was less than one hectare for 96 percent of
all Indonesian clove smallholders, and for 95 percent of clove smallholders in Maluku. The average number of trees
per household was 62 nationally, and 76 for Maluku” (p. 66).
To Look for “Localization”
A closer look at specific agro-ecological conditions is not to produce generalizations that might be useful to
policymakers calling for formulas that cut across countries. Many generalizations do not take into account
location-specific variations in the political-administrative, socio-legal, economic and agro-ecological condi-
tions that affect financial decisions of individuals and institutions. Therefore, I expect that the 20-years-old
litany on the failures of governments to establish sustainable credit programs to the benefit of rural poor, will
be heard for the next 20 years as well. To draw generalizations from case studies of financial intermediaries as
a way out of these failures, will at best lead to substitution of formulas, but will not stimulate a better analysis
and understanding of location-specific situations and problems. Therefore, I believe that what is needed in poli-
cymaking and research is not the pursuit of generalization but the pursuit of “localization”. 
With regard to policymaking, “localization” implies that national plans are adjusted to regional or local
conditions, including agro-ecological conditions. “Localization” also suggests decentralization of planning,
down to lower levels of administration, such as provincial and district levels. If there is to be an interest among
researchers in studying agro-ecological conditions, with the specific aim of drawing lessons for policymaking
on rural financial intermediation, this study should include the analysis of processes of policymaking and its
political-administrative constraints. It is quite embarrassing to find that policy-oriented research has hardly
given any attention to these processes of and barriers to policymaking. 
From an analytical point of view, I feel that the pursuit of “localization” fits perfectly in the broad concept
of rural finance outlined by Schmidt and Kropp (1987). Such a pursuit would question how agro-ecological
conditions affect the financial decisions of individuals and institutions in a particular area or “locality”. It also
raises the question how (changing) economic, political-administrative and socio-legal conditions affect these
decisions, and at the same time weaken, reinforce, transform or differentiate the impact of agro-ecological
conditions. 
The case of Ambon provides its own and specific answers to this two-fold agrarian question of financial
landscapes: the particular combination of sago and clove cultivation has implied labor and loan arrangements
that greatly differ from similar arrangements in rice producing areas (cf. Ghate 1992: 43-57) and also, other
silvicultures, like rubber and coconut. Cloves are a pure cash crop and have a production cycle in which
bumper harvests occur every three to four years, with insignificant yields in between. In addition, large varia-
tions in production can occur in a small area. As a result, highly institutionalized forms of cooperation among
owners of clove trees, and the use of credit as a labor-tying device, have not been feasible. The processing of
sago does not demand a large labor input and provides a minimal basis in terms of food security and housing.
Furthermore, there is no particular sago harvest season. As a result, types of credit and credit relations that
either guarantee food security or ensure ready availability of labor, have been absent in the sago economy of
Ambon. The non-mechanized collection of sago as well as the harvest of cloves by Ambonese required rather
ad-hoc forms of cooperation, reproducing broader social relations between relatives, neighbors and friends. 
The cultivation and consumption of sago have structured rural life on Ambon for centuries, and have proved
very important in times of hardship. Under different colonial regimes, the subsistence role of sago, in combi-
nation with fish and coconut, was not weakened, but rather reinforced. Rigid clove-production policies caused
relatively small, short and insecure income flows that could not provide a stable economic basis. In the post-
colonial period, however, the subsistence-oriented economy was turned upside down. As a result of the
dramatic increase in the money circulation and changes of consumption standards during the last two decades,
the subsistence role of sago weakened. The sharp increase of clove prices in the seventies provided a major
impulse in this connection. Concrete houses and rice became the new consumption standards. Consequently,
traditional forms of cooperative food collection and house construction among Ambonese eroded. Parallel to
this development, new types of relationships and forms of cooperation emerged, including credit relations
between Ambonese and Butonese. Butonese migrants quickly responded to the increase of money needs of
Ambonese and supplied credit in exchange for the right to harvest their clove trees. In this connection, these
trader-cum-moneylenders have done much better than official cooperatives, who have failed to gain a large
share in the marketing of cloves. This is largely due to the diverse financial and risk-minimizing strategies of
Butonese, who have developed much better insights into location specific agro-ecological conditions than have
cooperative officials. 
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